Introduction

Rémy Rioux, Chief Executive Officer of AFD

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Year on year since 2020, *L'Économie Africaine* has established itself as an essential snapshot of the continent's major challenges, offering nuanced, data-driven analysis unfettered by accepted ideas. In this seventh edition, La Découverte and the Agence française de développement (AFD) (French Development Agency) provide an even deeper analysis of Africa's place in a shifting global order.

Clearly, what the 2000s promised—an Africa free from conflict, buoyed by the simultaneous rise of North and South Africa, attracting private capital, and reaping a demographic dividend—has not come to pass. Things did not unfold as expected, and as new geopolitical, macroeconomic, and environmental upheavals emerge across the globe, the continent's transition remains far from complete.

In 2025, amid heightened global tensions, Africa exhibited macroeconomic resilience: Growth held steady and even accelerated compared to 2024, reaching approximately 4%, whereas average global growth slowed to around 3% according to the IMF. Given that the continent's integration into global value chains is still modest, trade tensions have had only a limited impact on Africa so far. Africa is now even home to several national economies that rank among the world's fastest growing.

Yet, this growth is still falling short of the levels recorded between 2008 and 2017, still struggling to keep pace with population growth, and still not generating enough savings to meet the continent's investment needs. At a time when official development assistance is collapsing, access to international markets and the cost of capital have become critical concerns. Mobilizing countries' financial systems, which are driven by national public development banks, is essential for unlocking the full potential of the continent's economy. The Finance in Common (FiCS) movement vigorously championed this message at its fifth summit, held in Cape Town in February 2025 alongside the meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors at the first African G20. And the message was echoed and amplified at the United Nations' 4th International Conference on Financing for Development, which took place in Seville in July.

In 2026, analyzing African economies means asking whether, at a time of persistent uncertainty, the drivers of growth remain robust and whether the reforms underway are restoring countries' fiscal space. In the **first chapter** of this latest edition, **Julia Brouillard** and **Simon Azuélos** analyze the investments required for the continent's development trajectories to stay on course amid the diversification of international actors, financial innovations, and states' mobilization of domestic revenue.

The second chapter addresses the trend of rising public debt among sub-Saharan African countries, which is the result of a combination of factors: persistent budget deficits, slowing commodity exports, external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and changes in the international financing landscape. The continent has nonetheless managed, so far, to contain debt-related pressures. In this chapter, **Samuel Delepierre**, **Thibault Lemaire**, **Arthur Sode**, and **Francine Nyankiye** identify the challenges involved in addressing situations of acute vulnerability. These include the need to reduce the risk of overindebtedness, the imperative to increase social spending and growth-oriented expenditure, and the difficulty of raising domestic revenue to finance development.

By 2050, one in three of the world's young people will be African. The **third chapter**, written by **Serge Rabier**, **John May**, and **Aristide Romaric Bado**, analyzes sub-Saharan Africa's rapid population growth. The continent will soon be home to a quarter of the world's population. Turning this into a demographic dividend will require sustained investment in education, health, employment, and the promotion of gender equality. The authors stress that as the global demographic transition unfolds at varying speeds, there is a need for long-term planning that integrates public policy, social innovation, and territorial governance.

Going against preconceived ideas, the continent's leaders, gathered in Addis Ababa last September for the second Africa Climate Summit, reaffirmed their commitment to positioning Africa as a provider of climate solutions. Although Africa emits relatively little CO_2, it is in fact one of the world's most vulnerable regions. Droughts, floods, biodiversity loss, and soil degradation are directly threatening livelihoods and economic stability across the continent. The **fourth chapter**, by **Christophe Buffet** and **Madeleine Diouf Sarr**, offers an analytical framework for linking knowledge generation, governance, and action so as to turn adaptation science into concrete measures. The authors emphasize that targeted investments in education, training, and

local adaptation mechanisms are an essential condition for building truly resilient development trajectories.

Africa's rapid urbanization is raising pressing questions about urban mobility. This is the subject of the **fifth chapter**, in which **Virginie Boutueil**, **Jean-François Sempéré**, and **Yao Tsoekeo Amedokpo** examine the renewal of urban public transit in Africa, marked by the return of major public investment and the emergence of innovative solutions. The rise of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, the digitalization of mobility services, the gradual electrification of fleets, and the redesign of transport networks all suggest a major transformation is underway. But challenges remain: inclusion of vulnerable populations, coordination between formal and informal transport, and the still-fragmented state of metropolitan-level governance. Here too, planning is essential if progress is to be consolidated. Equally important are recognition of the role played by intermediate transport modes (motorcycles, minibuses, and shared taxis) and sustainable funding for public transit operations.

Lastly, the **sixth chapter** focuses on the **cultural and creative industries**, which are taking up an increasingly prominent place in contemporary African economies. **Alessandro Jedlowski**, **Jaana Serres**, and **Audrey Perraud** focus specifically on **music and audiovisual production** in several sub-Saharan African countries, whose structuring and markets differ markedly from those of their North African neighbors. Drawing on historical reappraisal and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in (among other countries) Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Tanzania, they highlight the vitality of local scenes, the importance of diasporas, and the impact of digital platforms on the creation and distribution of works and on artists' remuneration. This research reveals deeply rooted dynamics in which creativity, entrepreneurship, and assertion of identity converge to redefine the continent's place in the global cultural economy. Beyond their economic heft, these industries are contributing to the construction of an African **cultural sovereignty** that tells a fresh story rooted in youth, linguistic diversity, and transnational exchange.

As usual, the book concludes with a timeline of key events in Africa in 2026 and a statistical appendix presenting the continent's key economic and social data, which were prepared respectively by **Maximin Wion** and **Vincent Joguet**.

In terms of relations between Africa and France, the highlight of the year will be the **Nairobi summit** on May 11 and 12, 2026. Eight years after President Emmanuel Macron's Ouagadougou speech, five years after the remarkable Montpellier summit with

African youth, and just months after the European Union–African Union summit in Luanda, this occasion will be an opportunity to renew the meaning of and articulate the interests that guide cooperation between Africa and France. This work—which each year strives to adopt an "All Africa" approach, moving beyond the artificial mental boundaries that still divide the continent in two—will, I hope, contribute to the initiatives surrounding the summit. Whether the matter at hand is access to financing, particularly from the private sector, young people's role in the continent's rise, or African economies' adaptations to the century's great challenges (climatic and technological alike), the African and European authors of this volume make many contributions indeed to the debates of 2026.

I / Financing growth: African economies under strain

Simon Azuélos (AFD) and Julia Brouillard (AFD)

Political and economic paradigm shifts and a new vision of international engagement made 2025 a year of upheaval. From the sudden permanent closure of USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) in July 2025 to the trade war launched in September 2025, African countries had to contend with intense political, macroeconomic, and financial uncertainty. Although they have navigated this turmoil, they will nevertheless need to adapt—on the one hand, to the sharp reduction in official development assistance and, on the other, to major trading partners' questioning of their integration into global value chains.

Will 2026 be a year of opportunity for Africa? The short term will be a matter of building macroeconomic resilience in order to become capable of withstanding global, national, and climate-related shocks. In the medium term, the financial paradigm shift—with less and less talk of development aid and more and more of investment for growth—will bring both new opportunities and new risks for the continent. One of the key issues in 2026 will therefore be how Africa's growth is financed.

Beginning with an analysis of the short-term macroeconomic situation, which reveals the urgent need for medium-term growth financing (Part I), this chapter examines key developments in the financing of African economies: the diversification of investors (Part II), innovations in financing, and states' mobilization of domestic revenues (Part III).

A strained situation: Between resilience and vulnerabilities

African economies have continued to grow despite global shocks and local constraints

Amid the series of shocks the global economy has suffered since 2020—from the COVID-19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine and the conflicts in the Middle East—Africa has held steady. The continent's real GDP growth reached 4.2% in 2025, and it is expected to rise to 4.3% in 2026 [International Monetary Fund

(IMF), 2025a]. Although Africa's upturn is more modest than it once was, it reflects the continent's resilience in a difficult global context marked by slowing global growth, tightening financial conditions, and, above all, acute economic and geopolitical uncertainty. This performance remains above the global growth rate, estimated at 3.1% for 2026 [IMF, 2025a]. Growth rates, however, remain below the levels achieved in the 2000s, and, more importantly, they are not enough to keep pace with rapid population growth (see Chapter III).

Moreover, the continental average masks significant disparities between regions. On the back of Ethiopian growth, East Africa is leading the upturn, with an average growth of nearly 6.7% expected in 2026, sustained by sharp increases in hydrocarbon prices and effective macroeconomic reforms. After this comes West Africa, with approximately 4.7% growth, driven by dynamic economies such as those of Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, and Guinea—countries buoyed by political stability, IMF-supported tax reforms, and the discovery of offshore deposits. Southern Africa, by contrast, appears to be lagging behind, with growth capped at around 2.1%—largely because of persistent difficulties in South Africa, whose sheer economic size weighs heavily on the entire subregion. The country faces a series of deep structural constraints. Despite some progress, water and electricity outages are hampering production, degraded logistics infrastructure is impeding trade, and underperforming state-owned enterprises have been draining an average of 5% of GDP each year since 2008, placing a lasting burden on public finances [IMF, 2025b].

The continental dynamic also reveals contrasting national economic trajectories. In 2026, twelve African countries are expected to record annual growth rates above 6%: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea [IMF, 2025a; AFD calculations]. Depending on the country, this performance reflects varying degrees of economic diversification, sustained investment in infrastructure or extractive sectors, or base effects linked to a post-crisis rebound. However, high growth in some countries does not necessarily reflect sustainable structural dynamics. This is true, for instance, of countries that have recently been affected by shocks or political transitions, where growth still masks deep fragilities (South Sudan is a case in point here.) Conversely, several economies—for instance, those of the Central African Republic and Chad—are likely to remain at the bottom of the rankings, held back by conflict, heavy dependence on commodities, or persistent macroeconomic imbalances. These growing divergences call into

question the continent's ability to converge lastingly on inclusive and sustainable growth.

Africa's growth is being undermined by persistent macroeconomic imbalances

Inflation remains high across the continent, continuing to erode household purchasing power. In 2025, it averaged nearly 12% in Africa, well above pre-pandemic levels [IMF, 2025a]. Although some countries such as Morocco and Senegal have managed to keep inflation under control, at around 2%, they remain exceptions in a context marked by food price volatility, exchange rate pressures, and international uncertainties. Some countries with high inflation in 2024, such as Nigeria, experienced gradual disinflation in 2025. Overall, the outlook could prove more favorable than anticipated, with inflation gradually normalizing in several subregions.

Figure 1: Consumer price index trends in Africa (2020-2025)



Source: IMF [2025b]; AFD calculations

African states are still heavily constrained by the burden that public debt levels are putting on their budgets (see Chapter II). Within the continent, access to financial markets remains the exception, and when it occurs, it typically comes on particularly

onerous terms. Between 2024 and 2030, annual debt servicing will represent 137.4% of Africa's climate financing needs each year [Global Development Policy Center (GDPC), 2025]. In this context, some countries are turning to bilateral financing to ease debt service burdens. In 2024, for example, Egypt secured massive support—USD 35 billion in total—from the United Arab Emirates. This support was crucial in restoring international donors' confidence and enabled the IMF program to resume.

Regional conflicts are weakening economic activity. The war in Sudan has forced more than 1.3 million people into exile since it began, affecting neighboring countries such as Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, chronic insecurity continues to disrupt the economy. Rising military spending (in Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Togo) is coming at the expense of social needs. Exposure to climate disasters remains high, with droughts and floods threatening agricultural production, food security, and infrastructure [IMF, 2023a].

Accelerating Africa's growth requires massive investment across all sectors of the economy

Africa's growth potential of around 4% speaks to a rebounding continent, but it falls short of offsetting the 2% annual population increase. Per capita GDP growth has actually stagnated in recent years, particularly compared with trends in other regions of the world (Figure 2).

The mass influx of young people into the labor market will be a crucial medium-term challenge. Increased investment in education and training to equip young people with the necessary skills is required. The investment needed in this area is immense: UNESCO and the World Bank indicate that achieving universal primary and secondary education in Africa would require USD 461 billion per year.

Figure 2: GDP per capita by region



Source: IMF [2025b]; AFD calculations

Another key determinant of medium-term trends involves African countries' economic diversification. In a context where financial markets' volatility weighs on commodity-exporting economies, the medium term could favor economies that succeed in expanding their productive base. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that there will be an annual financing gap of USD 402.2 billion—roughly 13.7% of Africa's projected GDP by 2030—if what it calls "structural transformation needs" [AfDB, 2024] are to be met.

Beyond productive investment, Africa is acutely exposed to the consequences of climate change. Large-scale investments are needed to implement climate change adaptation policies (see Chapter IV), expand renewable energy production and use, and develop climate-resilient agriculture. Meeting these needs would require at least USD 250 billion annually—roughly 10% of Africa's GDP [Châtelain et al., 2024]—to be mobilized across multiple sectors, including energy, agriculture, water, and health. These funds would support disaster prevention and the adaptation of infrastructure to withstand climate impacts.

The financing of African growth is diversifying: External support and partnerships

With traditional sources of official development assistance drying up, financing costs are rising

Traditional sources of financing can no longer meet Africa's needs. On the one hand, official development assistance (ODA)—

provided by member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and a source of concessional financing for many African countries—is declining. At present, it is insufficient on its own to meet the continent's needs. Multilateral aid for the continent, provided by development actors such as the World Bank (for projects) and the IMF (for macroeconomic stabilization), is sizable, but it too falls short of meeting needs. On the other hand, financing through financial markets—which began in the 2000s for many African countries—is now severely constrained by what have become prohibitive costs in the current global financial environment.

Figure 3: Trends in ODA



Source: World Bank [2025a]; AFD calculations

Emerging countries continue to be key actors in financing African development

The emergence of new actors in development finance, particularly for Africa, has been one of the major shifts in economic geopolitics in recent years. China has become an indispensable partner for African countries. At the financial level, China's share of total external public debt in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 2% in 2005 to 17% in 2021 [IMF, 2023b]. Among bilateral creditors, China is the continent's largest investor, holding approximately 60% of African countries' bilateral debt [IRIS, 2024]. China is therefore now central to maintaining macroeconomic stability across the African continent.

Other emerging partners have assumed an increasingly prominent role in development finance. Turkey, in particular, has ramped up its involvement; the value of its bilateral trade with

Africa reached USD 32 billion in 2023 [Adeoye et al., 2024]. To give an example, the Turkish group Albayrak is now the leading investor in port modernization in Somalia, the Gambia, and Guinea. The Gulf states—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in particular—have also become highly active on the continent, having announced financing of more than USD 53 billion for African projects in 2023 [World Economic Forum, 2024]. These countries are mainly focused on targeted investments in agriculture and infrastructure. Qatar, for instance, announced funding for the renovation of Bangui airport in the Central African Republic.

The variety of independent actors complicates the work of international financial institutions

Cooperation with the IMF remains a priority for all the new contributors to African financing. China in particular is a major decision-maker at the IMF (6.4% of Executive Board shares), and the yuan is included in the basket of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This international reserve asset was created by the IMF to supplement member countries' official reserves. Its value is based on a basket of major international currencies, namely the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound, and, since 2016, the Chinese yuan. Despite its central role in international financial institutions, China remains opaque about its external financing, whether in Africa or across the Belt and Road Initiative, and it does not contribute financially to implementing IMF programs. China's participation in public debt restructuring, meanwhile, is central to the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (in the cases of Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia). Even so, it is still only an ad hoc participant in the Paris Club, and sometimes it continues to prefer bilateral negotiations.

By and large, new donors are continuing to prioritize the bilateral approach. Admittedly, the Gulf states in particular do contribute to certain multilateral initiatives such as the International Development Association (the World Bank's concessional window) and trust funds related to food security, climate resilience, and post-conflict reconstruction. They also play a substantial part in completing IMF macroeconomic stabilization programs. However, the Gulf's major sovereign wealth funds and financial institutions—for instance, the Saudi Fund for Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, the Qatar Fund for Development, and the Kuwait Fund—often operate outside multilateral frameworks, on a bilateral basis. And their political, religious, or strategic rationales are not always

transparent, making them difficult for traditional donors to interpret.

Box 1—Egypt: Adjustments amid outside influence

The IMF program in Egypt was accompanied by unprecedented bilateral support from the Gulf states, a development that marked a financial paradigm shift. In March 2024, the IMF expanded its program to USD 8 billion (up from an initial USD 3 billion), combining an adjustment facility with a Resilience and Sustainability Facility [IMF, 2025c]. In the midst of a balance of payments crisis made worse by declining Suez Canal revenues and imported inflation, Egypt received significant support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates via its central bank. At the same time, the UAE announced a USD 35 billion investment, USD 24 billion of which was for developing the Ras Al-Hikma resort. The investment was tied to a right of first refusal on future privatized assets [Finance for Development Lab, 2024]. This external liquidity put an end to the foreign currency shortage and the parallel currency market, and it facilitated both liberalization and stabilization of the exchange rate, following a final 38% devaluation in March 2024. These developments have supported the rebound in economic activity and the ongoing disinflation.

However, this involvement of nontraditional partners raises questions about economic sovereignty and geopolitical alignment. Beyond aligning with IMF conditionalities, the Gulf states are using their status as donors to secure strategic advantages: Under the IMF program, Egypt committed to privatizing state-owned enterprises, and the Gulf investors negotiated a right of first refusal on these assets. As a result, Saudi and Emirati sovereign wealth funds have acquired stakes in key Egyptian companies (ports, petrochemicals, finance, distribution), altering the ownership structure of strategic sectors. This quid pro quo is transforming the role played by financial partners, with Gulf creditors further anchoring the country within their political orbit.

Taking charge of Africa's growth financing: New practices and developing financial sovereignty

In response to heightened financing needs and the scarcity of cheap capital, African countries are exploring new approaches to financing their development. Two complementary trends are emerging: on the one hand, the rise of new financial instruments, particularly from Islamic finance, and, on the other, an increased effort to mobilize domestic resources through strengthened taxation and administration. These strategies aim to increase the continent's fiscal resilience by reducing its dependence on the vagaries of fluctuating international financial markets, which make financing costs unpredictable.

The rise of Islamic finance reflects the Gulf states' entry into African financing

Islamic finance is a set of financial practices that comply with the principles of sharia, which prohibits the payment or receipt of interest (*riba*), excessive uncertainty in contracts (*gharar*), and the financing of activities that are deemed impermissible. It is based on risk-sharing mechanisms and investment in the real economy (Box 2).

Box 2—Sukuk in Africa: Islamic finance supporting development financing

Islamic finance, driven especially by the development of sharia-compliant bonds known as *sukuk*, is gaining momentum in Africa. Unlike conventional bonds, sukuk do not generate interest but instead offer investors a share of the revenues generated by an underlying tangible asset—for instance, infrastructure or public buildings. These instruments allow states both to diversify their financing sources by mobilizing capital from the Middle East and Asia and to finance national development projects. Many African countries (Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, etc.) have shown interest in them, but only a few stand out as trailblazers or regional hubs in the development of Islamic finance.

Nigeria has emerged as a pioneer on the continent. Since 2017, its government has issued six sovereign *sukuk* totaling nearly USD 720 million to finance 124 road projects across the country's six geopolitical zones [Nigeria Debt Management Office, 2022]. Successive *sukuk* issuances have met with strong subscription rates, but with yields that are close to those of conventional bonds—a counterpoint to their often-cited cost advantages.

Other African countries have followed suit. Senegal has issued two sovereign *sukuk* (in 2014 and 2022) allocated to the energy sector and social infrastructure and totaling nearly USD 450 million [IMF, 2022]. Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia have also issued *sukuk*, with technical support from the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). However, the sums involved are modest, often below USD 100 million per issuance [IsDB, 2015; IsDB, 2016; Central Bank of the Gambia, 2024].

Even with these initiatives, the African market is still but nascent, representing only about 0.7% of the global *sukuk* market—that is, barely USD 6 billion in issuances between 2014 and 2024. More than two-thirds of these amounts are concentrated in three countries: Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt.

Even so, the prospects remain promising. Amid the recent surge in the cost of financing—not only on international markets (eurobonds) but also within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), where CFA franc bond auction rates rose sharply in 2023-2024—some states are considering domestic *sukuk* issuances in local currency. However, these instruments continue to be constrained by high structuring costs and the need for specialized legal and religious expertise, meaning the extent of their use is currently limited.

Increased mobilization of tax revenues and administrative modernization

In a context of growing fiscal burdens and persistent dependence on external financing, the mobilization of domestic resources has emerged as a central lever for economic resilience. Although the average tax burden in Africa is modest—at around 15% of GDP, the level is well below international standards—several countries have launched ambitious reforms to broaden the tax base, modernize administration, and improve compliance [World Bank, 2023; IMF, 2024]. The goal is to make fiscal sovereignty more robust and thus capable of supporting development financing without excessive reliance on external borrowing.

Box 3—Building fiscal states: Toward fiscal sovereignty

Several African countries, such as Rwanda, have undertaken deep transformations of their tax systems. After digitalizing its tax administration by introducing online filing and payment and electronic invoicing, Rwanda's government revenue ratio rose from 13% of GDP in 2010 to 16.8% in 2024. In 2025, 99.4% of Rwandan tax returns were filed online.

Benin is on a similar trajectory. Tax code reform, the widespread adoption of online payments, and the integration of mobile payments (that is, financial transactions conducted via cell phone, without the need for a traditional bank account) have raised tax revenues to 13.1% of GDP in 2024, up from 11.1% in 2020 [AfDB, 2024].

In Senegal, the challenge is twofold. The first is modernizing the cadastre to improve property tax revenues, which, at 0.3% of GDP, remain low. By comparison, the OECD average is 1.9% of GDP, and in several African countries, such as Morocco and South Africa, revenues are around 1% of GDP [OECD, 2022; IsDB, 2023]. In 2025, a unified digital platform for local taxes was launched, with joint support from the IMF and the World Bank. At the same time, online tax filing has been extended to large companies, and a review of tax loopholes, particularly in the area of VAT, has been launched [World Bank, 2025b; IMF, 2025d].

These initiatives, which are receiving technical support from international institutions, aim to strengthen states' budgetary autonomy, a key condition for reducing dependence on aid and international financial markets.

Complementarity between innovative financing and domestic resource mobilization

The use of alternative financial instruments and the mobilization of domestic resources complement one another, and they form the foundation of fiscal resilience generated from within. Alternative financing provides new resources to close investment deficits, provided that a stable macroeconomic framework is in place, as the IMF notes in its *Regional Economic Outlook* for Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, increased mobilization

of domestic resources strengthens public finances and reduces dependence on external financing. This also reassures foreign investors and creditors about the viability of national economic models.

As a result, a state capable of broadening its tax base while keeping its budget under control attracts new financing at a lower cost, creating a virtuous cycle between domestic resources and external capital. However, this strategy requires rigorous and transparent management of the budget and of public debt; poor governance can lead to opaque and uncontrolled commitments.

The case of Senegal illustrates this risk. In 2025, an audit by the Court of Auditors, confirmed by the IMF, revealed a hidden debt of nearly USD 7 billion—equivalent to 23% of GDP—accumulated between 2019 and 2024; it had been concealed through off-budget contracts and undeclared arrears. This situation led to the temporary suspension of the IMF support program and the imposition of stricter transparency requirements on the Senegalese authorities.

This case underscores the importance of aligning financing instruments with sound public management. Multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the AfDB play a crucial role in providing technical support through tax reforms, debt monitoring, and institutional capacity building. Such support helps to prevent openness to new financing from becoming a source of increased vulnerability, instead fostering a reliable and sustainable long-term trajectory.

Conclusion

2025 was a year with no shortage of political events and global uncertainty. Africa's resilience to these shocks is undeniable; Africa's growth leaders continued to make gains despite an uncertain international environment and economic downturns that are difficult to quantify. Even so, the continent's 54 countries are following different growth trajectories, with the most diversified economies demonstrating resilience and driving continental growth.

The main challenges for Africa continue to involve finding financing for a form of development that raises per capita incomes, limits inequality, and follows the lowest-carbon pathway possible, all while adapting to climate change. Interest rate movements over the past five years have sharply increased the cost of financing on financial markets, and ODA budgets are shrinking drastically. Yet,

African financing needs, driven by these challenges and by population growth, remain substantial.

In view of the financing challenges, the emergence of new development actors beyond China is a boon for the continent's states. It is enabling a diversification of financing sources and attracting foreign capital, though it is also causing some fragmentation of financial resources. And these new donors' practices cannot but create scope for risks in terms of African states' sovereignty.

Above all, acting upon the continent's financing needs, African countries are seeking to take their economic destiny into their own hands by implementing financial approaches that suit them and mobilizing their domestic resources. A key element of economic sovereignty, inclusive development, and long-term macroeconomic stability, this mobilization of domestic resources is the central challenge for African countries in the years ahead.

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